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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Brad Lightner, individually, and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated, Respondent,  
v. 
Hampton Hall Club, Inc., State of South Carolina, South 
Carolina Department of Revenue, Beaufort County and 
John Doe, Defendants, 
of whom State of South Carolina and South Carolina 
Department of Revenue are, Petitioners. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001952 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Appeal From Beaufort County 

Perry M. Buckner, III, Circuit Court Judge  

Opinion No. 27700 

Heard May 18, 2016 – Filed February 1, 2017 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED 
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Attorney General Alan M. Wilson and Deputy Solicitor 
General J. Emory Smith, Jr., both of Columbia, for 
Petitioner State of South Carolina; Milton G. Kimpson 
and Tasha B. Thompson, both of Columbia, for Petitioner 
South Carolina Department of Revenue. 
Kathleen C. Barnes, of Barnes Law Firm, LLC; Ronnie 
L. Crosby and William F. Barnes, III, both of Peters 
Murdaugh Parker Eltzroth & Detrick, PA, all of 
Hampton, for Respondent. 
CHIEF JUSTICE BEATTY:  Brad Lightner, individually, and on behalf of 
all others similarly situated, ("Respondent") brought this action against Hampton 
Hall Club, Inc., the State of South Carolina, the South Carolina Department of 
Revenue ("SCDOR"), Beaufort County, and John Doe1 ("Defendants"), alleging 
Defendants wrongfully collected and retained admissions taxes. After Respondent
filed a motion for class certification, the State and the SCDOR ("Petitioners") filed
a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, or, in the alternative, to 
strike pursuant to Rule 12(f), SCRCP, to dismiss the State as a party and to stay 
discovery. In so moving, Petitioners asserted, inter alia, Respondent is required to
exhaust the administrative remedies under the South Carolina Revenue Procedures 
Act2 ("Act") and is prohibited from proceeding as a class action against the 
SCDOR. 
The circuit court determined the Act is inapplicable to this action because 
the General Assembly intended to limit the Act's application to disputes with the  
SCDOR concerning property taxes, which both parties conceded were not at issue.  
Thus, contrary to Petitioners' assertions, Respondent was not required to exhaust 
the administrative remedies under the Act in order to proceed individually against
all Defendants. The court, however, granted Petitioners' motion to dismiss the 
class action allegations, finding the Act, which it determined was inapplicable to 
1 "John Doe" collectively represents other unknown nonprofit corporations that 
have wrongfully collected admissions taxes from its members.   
2  S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-60-10 to -3390 (2014 & Supp. 2015).
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this dispute, nevertheless prohibited Respondent from bringing a class action 
lawsuit against Petitioners.  We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
I. Factual and Procedural History 
Hampton Hall Club, Inc. is a nonprofit organization in Beaufort County.
Respondent, a member of Hampton Hall, filed this action individually, and on 
behalf of all others similarly situated against Defendants, alleging Defendants 
collected and retained an admissions tax on its members' club and golf dues in 
contravention of section 12-21-2420(4) of the South Carolina Code, which states, 
in pertinent part: "[N]o admission tax shall be charged or collected by reason of
any charge made to any member of a nonprofit organization or corporation for the
use of the facilities of the organization or corporation of which he is a member."  
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2420(4) (2014).   
Respondent asserted three causes of action in his complaint. Against all 
Defendants, Respondent sought damages under quantum meruit and a declaration 
that Defendants' collection and retention of the admissions tax was unlawful.  
Against John Doe and Hampton Hall, Respondent also asserted a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim. In addition, Respondent requested an order enjoining 
Defendants from continuing to collect and retain the admissions tax.   
After Respondent filed a motion for class certification, Petitioners filed a  
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, or, in the alternative, to 
strike pursuant to Rule 12(f), SCRCP. Petitioners argued the action against the
SCDOR should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, since: (1) 
Respondent is required to exhaust the administrative remedies under the Act; and 
(2) the Act bars Respondent from bringing a class action lawsuit under section 12-
60-80(C).3 In the alternative, Petitioners contended all class action allegations 
3  Section 12-60-80(C) provides:
Notwithstanding subsections (A) and (B), a claim or action for the 
refund of taxes may not be brought as a class action in the 
Administrative Law Court or any court of law in this State, and the  
department, political subdivisions, or their instrumentalities may not 
be named or made a defendant in any other class action brought in this 
State. 
16 

  
 
   
 
   
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
    
  
  
  
                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
   
 
against the SCDOR should be stricken pursuant to Rule 12(f), SCRCP, because of
the prohibition on class action lawsuits under section 12-60-80(C). Petitioners also 
argued Respondent's allegations that he is entitled to injunctive relief to prevent the 
collection of admissions taxes should be stricken in accordance with section 12-60-
60.4 In addition, Petitioners asserted the State should be dismissed as a party 
because the SCDOR is responsible for administering and enforcing the tax laws of 
the State. 
In Respondent's memorandum in opposition to Petitioners' motion, 
Respondent argued the application of the Act is limited to property tax disputes
with the SCDOR. Because this dispute does not concern property taxes, 
Respondent contended the provisions under the Act concerning the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, prohibition of class action lawsuits, and bar on injunctive 
relief do not apply to this action. Further, while section 12-4-10 grants the 
SCDOR the authority "to administer and enforce the revenue laws of this State," 
Respondent maintained the State is still a proper party to this dispute because the 
statute does not state or imply the SCDOR is the sole entity with that authority.   
After a hearing, the circuit  court  determined the Act did not  apply because 
its application is limited to disputes with the SCDOR concerning property taxes.
Thus, Respondent was not required to exhaust the administrative remedies under 
the Act in order to proceed individually against all Defendants. Nevertheless, 
relying on this Court's decision in Drummond v. State, 378 S.C. 362, 662 S.E.2d 
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-80(C) (2014).   
4  Section 12-60-60 states: 
An action of a court or an administrative law judge cannot stay 
or prevent the department or an officer of the State charged with a
duty in the collection of taxes, from acting to collect a tax, whether or 
not the tax is legally due. 
Id. § 12-60-60 (2014).
17 
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587 (2008),5 the circuit court granted Petitioners' motion to strike the class action 
allegations, finding the Act, which it previously determined did not apply to this 
action, prevented Respondent from proceeding as a class action against the 
SCDOR. 
Following the issuance of the circuit court's order, the SCDOR emailed the 
court's law clerk and asked for clarification regarding the court's decision on the 
issue of whether the State is a proper party to the action. The email stated: "There 
is one matter  for  clarification:  The Order does  not specify,  but it is the 
Department's understanding that granting the Department's motion to dismiss is 
effectively dismissing the State as well - as the Department is acting on behalf of 
the State. Is this a correct reading of the Order?" The law clerk replied "That was 
our understanding as well." 
Respondent filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP motion to reconsider, arguing: (1) it 
is inconsistent to find the Act does not apply to this dispute, yet apply a provision 
from the Act to prohibit Respondent from proceeding as a class action; (2) 
Drummond does not apply to this action; and (3) the circuit court's order does not
have the effect of dismissing a defendant. The circuit court denied Respondent's
motion to reconsider. However, in its order denying the motion, the court clarified 
its initial order, stating: 
Finally, to clear up any confusion from the July 9 Order, the 
Court finds that the Plaintiffs may proceed as an individual against all 
Defendants, including the SCDOR and the State of South Carolina, 
  In  Drummond, plaintiff sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the 
SCDOR exceeded its authority in promulgating a regulation that allegedly did not
conform to the statute authorizing a state tax exemption for diabetic supplies.
Drummond, 378 S.C. at 369, 662 S.E.2d at 590. This Court recognized that 
Drummond was in effect challenging the facial validity of the regulation. In 
remanding this issue to the circuit court, we held, in this instance, the Act did not
apply because the Administrative Law Court ("ALC") does not have the authority 
"to rule on the validity of a regulation." Id. at 370, 662 S.E.2d at 591. Following 
our holding on this issue, we stated section "12-60-80(C), which prohibits a class 
action, applies not only to administrative law cases but also to tax cases brought in 
circuit court. . . . Accordingly, this action may not be certified as a class action."  
Id. at 370 n.5, 662 S.E.2d at 591 n.5.
18 

  
 
  
 
 
  
   
   
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
without the necessity of exhausting administrative remedies. The 
class action allegations against the SCDOR and the State of South 
Carolina are ordered dismissed.   
Respondent subsequently filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals.
Shortly thereafter, Petitioners filed a petition for extraordinary relief including a
writ of certiorari in this Court, asserting: (1) the circuit court erred in determining 
the Act is limited to disputes concerning property taxes; (2) Respondent is required 
to exhaust the administrative remedies under the Act; and (3) the State should be
dismissed from this action. By way of return, Respondent argued, inter alia, the 
circuit court erred in applying the class action prohibition under the Act.  After this
Court granted certiorari, the Court of Appeals dismissed Respondent's appeal on 
the basis that class certification orders are not immediately appealable. As a result, 
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari, asking this Court to review both the 
Court of Appeals' dismissal and the circuit court's dismissal of the class action
allegations against Petitioners. That appeal is being held in abeyance until the 
resolution of this appeal. 
II. Standard of Review 
"An issue regarding statutory interpretation is a question of law." Univ. of S. 
California v. Moran, 365 S.C. 270, 274, 617 S.E.2d 135, 137 (Ct. App. 2005).  
"[T]his Court reviews questions of law de novo." Town of Summerville v. City of
N. Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008). "The cardinal rule of 
statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent whenever 
possible." Mitchell v. City of Greenville, 411 S.C. 632, 634, 770 S.E.2d 391, 392 
(2015). 
III. Discussion 
A. Whether the Act is limited to disputes with the SCDOR concerning 
property taxes. 
Petitioners contend the circuit court erred in determining the Act is only 
applicable to disputes with the SCDOR concerning property taxes.  We agree. 
Section 12-60-20 of the South Carolina Code provides: 
19 

 It is the intent of the General Assembly to provide the people of this 
State with a straightforward procedure to determine a dispute with the 
Department of Revenue and a dispute concerning property taxes. 
The South Carolina Revenue Procedures Act must be interpreted and 
construed in accordance with, and in furtherance of, that intent. 
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-20 (2014) (emphasis added).   
 
In determining the Act only applies to property tax disputes with the 
SCDOR, the circuit court essentially interpreted the language "a dispute with the 
Department of Revenue and a dispute concerning property taxes" as "a dispute 
with the Department of Revenue concerning property taxes."  This interpretation, 
however, renders the words "and a dispute" in the statute meaningless and thereby 
violates our rules of statutory interpretation.  See In re Decker, 322 S.C. 215, 219, 
471 S.E.2d 462, 463 (1995) ("A statute should be so construed that no word, 
clause, sentence, provision or part shall be rendered surplusage, or superfluous."  
(citation omitted)).   
 
Giving effect to each word in the statute, we do not believe the General 
Assembly intended to limit the application of the Act to property tax disputes with 
the SCDOR.  The plain language of the statute, including the repetition of the 
terms "a dispute" after the term "and," indicates the General Assembly intended to 
distinguish "a dispute with the Department of Revenue" from "a dispute 
concerning property taxes."  It does not suggest the General Assembly intended for 
these two provisions to be combined into one limited category of disputes to which 
the Act would apply. 
 
Respondent argues this interpretation effectively changes the "and" in the 
statute to "or."  We disagree.  By recognizing that the General Assembly intended 
to distinguish between "a dispute with the Department of Revenue" and "a dispute 
concerning property taxes," we clarify that the Act applies to disputes with the 
SCDOR, which may not concern property taxes, and to disputes concerning 
property taxes, which may involve the SCDOR or a county or municipality.  Thus, 
we do not believe the General Assembly intended for the "and" to be interpreted as 
limiting the Act's application to property tax disputes with the SCDOR.  This belief 
is further supported by a review of the Act as a whole and the statute's legislative 
history. 
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1. Act as a whole 
The Act consists of four articles—1, 5, 9, and 13. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-60-
10 to -3390 (2014 & Supp. 2015). Article 1 is titled "General Provisions" and 
includes, inter alia, the legislative intent and definitions. Id. §§ 12-60-10 to -90 
(2014). Article 5 outlines the procedures for filing a claim for a tax refund and for 
challenging tax assessments. Id. §§ 12-60-410 to -920 (2014). Article 5 also 
outlines the procedures involved in adjudicating disputes concerning the licensing 
of beer, wine, and liquor. Id. §§ 12-60-1310 to -1350 (2014). Article 9 concerns 
the procedures for resolving state and county property tax disputes. Id. §§ 12-60-
1710 to -2940 (2014 & Supp. 2015). Article 13 provides the procedures for 
revenue cases in the ALC. Id. §§ 12-60-3310 to -3390 (2014).   
It is clear the Act concerns more than property tax disputes with the 
SCDOR. Therefore, limiting the Act's application to property tax disputes with the 
SCDOR would effectively render the remaining provisions under the Act 
concerning, inter alia, the adjudication of disputes over the licensing of beer, wine, 
and liquor superfluous and meaningless. "This Court will not construe a statute in 
a way which leads to an absurd result or renders it meaningless." Florence Cnty.
Democratic Party v. Florence Cnty. Republican Party, 398 S.C. 124, 128, 727 
S.E.2d 418, 420 (2012). 
2. Legislative history6 
The  General  Assembly enacted the Act in  1995.  At  that time, the legislative 
intent under section 12-60-20 read, in pertinent part, "to provide the people of this 
State with a straightforward procedure to determine any disputed revenue liability." 
Act No. 60, 1995 S.C. Acts 362, 367 (emphasis added). In 2000, the General 
Assembly amended the legislative intent to "to provide the people of this State 
with a straightforward procedure to determine any dispute with the Department of 
Revenue." Act No. 399, 2000 S.C. Acts 3432, 3461 (emphasis added). In 2007,
the General Assembly amended section 12-60-20 to its current form "to provide  
the people of this State with a straightforward procedure to determine a dispute
with the Department of Revenue and a dispute concerning property taxes."  Act  
No. 110, 2007 S.C. Acts 557, 583 (emphasis added); Act No. 116, 2007 S.C. Acts
688, 730 (emphasis added).   
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In the preamble of the 2007 Act that amended the statute to its current form,
the General Assembly explained it intended "to include disputes concerning 
property taxes." Act No. 110, 2007 S.C. Acts 557, 561-62 (emphasis added); Act 
No. 116, 2007 S.C. Acts 688, 694 (emphasis added). This Court has stated that 
"[w]hile the preamble is not a part of the effective portion of a statute, it may
supply the guide to the meaning of an act." Mitchell v. City of Greenville, 411 S.C. 
632, 634, 770 S.E.2d 391, 392 (2015). By stating its intent was "to include 
disputes concerning property taxes," we do not believe the General Assembly
intended to limit the Act's application to property tax disputes with the SCDOR.
For these reasons, we find the circuit court erred in determining the Act is 
limited to property tax disputes with the SCDOR.   
B. Whether 	 Respondent is required to exhaust the administrative 
remedies under the Act. 
Petitioners assert the circuit court erred in finding Respondent was not 
required to exhaust the administrative remedies under the Act. We agree. 
Section 12-60-80 provides, in relevant part: 
(A) Except as provided in subsection (B), there is no remedy 
other than those provided in this chapter in any case involving the 
illegal or wrongful collection of taxes, or attempt to collect taxes. 
(B) Notwithstanding subsection (A), an action for a declaratory
judgment where the sole issue is whether a statute is constitutional
may be brought in circuit court. This exception does not include a
claim that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to a person or a
limited class or classes of persons. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-80 (2014) (emphasis added).   
The term "tax" is defined under the Act as "taxes, licenses, permits, fees, or
other amounts, including interest, regulatory and other penalties, and civil fines, 
imposed by this title, or subject to assessment or collection by the department." Id. 
§ 12-60-30(27) (2014). The admissions tax at issue here is a "tax" as defined under 
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the Act because it is a tax subject to the assessment or collection by the SCDOR.7 
Therefore, because this action does not challenge the constitutionality of a statute, 
but rather the wrongful collection of taxes, Respondent is limited to the 
administrative remedies available under the Act.   
Accordingly, the circuit court's decision on this issue is reversed and the 
action is remanded for the circuit court to dismiss the case without prejudice. See
id. § 12-60-3390 (2014) ("If a taxpayer brings an action covered by this chapter in 
circuit court, the circuit court shall dismiss the case without prejudice."). 
C. Whether Respondent is prohibited from proceeding as a class action. 
As an initial matter, Petitioners contend Respondent's argument as  to  
whether the circuit court erred in applying the class action prohibition under the 
Act is not properly before this Court because the issue was not raised in Petitioners' 
petition for a writ of certiorari. Even assuming Petitioners are correct, we 
nonetheless reach the merits of Respondent's argument given: (1) the interest  of  
judicial economy; (2) the already tortured procedural history of this case; (3) the
issue is intertwined with the other arguments raised on appeal; and (4) both parties 
addressed the issue in their briefs and oral arguments before the Court in this case.  
Turning to the issue's merits, we hold Respondent is prohibited from
proceeding as a class action albeit not for the same reasons relied on by the circuit 
court. Section 12-60-80(C) provides: 
Notwithstanding subsections (A) and (B), a claim or action for the 
refund of taxes may not be brought as a class action in the 
Administrative Law Court or any court of law in this State, and the  
department, political subdivisions, or their instrumentalities may not 
be named or made a defendant in any other class action brought in this 
State. 
7 See id. § 12-21-2550 (2014) ("A person liable to the [admissions] tax shall make 
a true and correct return to the department . . . . If a person fails to make a true and
correct return or fails to file the return, the department shall make an estimate of
the tax liability from the best information available, and issue a proposed 
assessment for the taxes, including penalties and interest."). 
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8 
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-80(C) (2014). The plain language of the statute prohibits 
a claim for a tax refund from being brought as a class action in any court of law in 
this state. Therefore, Respondent is prohibited from proceeding as a class action 
for the refund of the state admissions taxes.8 
IV. Conclusion 
In sum, we hold the circuit court erred in finding the Act's application is 
limited to disputes with the SCDOR concerning property taxes. Because the Act is 
applicable to this case, Respondent is required to follow the administrative 
remedies under the Act and is prohibited from proceeding as a class action against 
Petitioners. Based on the disposition of the abovementioned issues, we decline to 
reach Petitioners' remaining argument. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of 
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing this
Court need not address remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is 
dispositive of the appeal). 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
KITTREDGE, HEARN, JJ., and Acting Justice Costa M. Pleicones, 
concur. FEW, J., concurring in a separate opinion. 
After finding the Act was inapplicable to this case, the circuit court, relying on 
this Court's decision in Drummond v. State, 378 S.C. 362, 662 S.E.2d 587 (2008), 
determined Respondent was prohibited from proceeding as a class action against
Petitioners. Respondent argues it is inconsistent to find the Act is inapplicable to 
this case, yet apply a provision from the Act to its outcome. We need not address 
Respondent's argument or the circuit court's reliance on Drummond because we
find the Act, and its provisions concerning the prohibition on class actions and 
exhaustion of administrative remedies, applies to this case. 
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JUSTICE FEW: I concur with the majority opinion except for subsection III.A.  
As to that subsection, I concur only with the result reached by the majority because 
I have one important disagreement regarding the application of our rules of 
statutory interpretation. 
This Court has repeatedly held, "Where the statute's language is plain and 
unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory 
interpretation are not needed . . . ." State v. Ramsey, 409 S.C. 206, 209, 762 S.E.2d 
15, 17 (2014) (quoting Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 
(2000)); see also Lambries v. Saluda Cty. Council, 409 S.C. 1, 10, 760 S.E.2d 785, 
789 (2014) ("If a statute is ambiguous, the courts must construe its terms."); 
Timmons v. S.C. Tricentennial Comm'n, 254 S.C. 378, 401, 175 S.E.2d 805, 817 
(1970) ("If a statute is clear and explicit in its language, then there is no need to 
resort to statutory interpretation or legislative intent to determine its meaning.").  In 
this case, relying on what it calls "the plain language" of section 12-60-20 of the 
South Carolina Code (2014), the majority finds the exhaustion of remedies 
requirement of the Revenue Procedures Act applies both to "a dispute with the 
Department of Revenue" and to "a dispute concerning property taxes."  
Nevertheless, the majority proceeds to employ various rules of statutory 
interpretation to explain the meaning of section 12-60-20.   
I agree the plain language of section 12-60-20 is unambiguous and conveys a clear 
and definite meaning.  Therefore, I agree the section requires the result the 
majority reaches. I disagree, however, that it is appropriate to employ rules of 
statutory interpretation after finding the statute's meaning is plain.  Under this 
Court's own repeatedly-stated admonition, "the rules of statutory interpretation are 
not needed." Ramsey, 409 S.C. at 209, 762 S.E.2d at 17. 
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LOCKEMY, C.J.: The Lee County School District Board of Trustees (the Board) 
appeals the circuit court's reversal of its decision to terminate the employment of 
teacher Laura Toney. We affirm. 
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FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Laura Toney was employed as a social studies teacher at Lee Central High School 
(the School) in the Lee County School District (the District).1  On September 27, 
2013, Toney attended a social studies departmental meeting at the School along 
with five other teachers, including Teacher B.  During the meeting, Toney 
commented to Teacher B that she knew he could relate to her sadness over losing 
her husband because Teacher B had also recently lost a spouse.  Several days after 
the meeting, Teacher B filed a grievance alleging Toney revealed private 
information regarding his sexual orientation to his coworkers during the September 
27 meeting.  Teacher B asserted Toney's sharing of private details of his life was 
an attack on his character and could have resulted in him losing his job and his 
positive relationships with his coworkers and students.   
Upon receipt of the grievance, the School's principal—Ron Webb—and another 
School administrator—Bernard McDaniel—met with Toney to advise her of the 
grievance. Webb informed Toney he would handle the grievance upon his return 
from a conference and instructed Toney not to pursue the matter until his return.  
Several days later, Toney contends she found a packet left in her classroom 
containing copies of Facebook posts written by Teacher B.2  Toney reported her 
receipt of the packet to McDaniel, and he refused to discuss it with her.  McDaniel 
subsequently told Toney that if she had something to tell him regarding the matter, 
she should put it in writing. Toney then gave McDaniel a copy of the Facebook 
posts. Toney also left a sealed envelope containing a copy of the posts at the office 
of the District's Superintendent, Dr. Wanda Andrews.  According to Toney, she 
provided a copy to the Superintendent because she was concerned a child might be 
in danger. 
1 Toney was employed by the District for twenty-three years.   
2 The contents of the packet were later proffered under seal at an evidentiary 
hearing before the Board and inspected in camera. The postings included negative 
comments about Toney and an exchange with an individual identified as a student 
at Sumter High School containing sexual implications. The posts also contained 
references to Teacher B's sexual orientation and a photo of his deceased spouse.  
According to Teacher B, the posts were his, were not set to "private," and were 
accessible by his Facebook friends including fellow teachers and at least one 
student. 
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Upon Webb's return to the School, he learned Toney had taken the Facebook posts
to the Superintendent. Thereafter, the Superintendent met with Webb, McDaniel, 
and Toney at the School.  According to the Superintendent, Toney was 
uncooperative during the meeting and did not give direct answers to any of the 
questions she was asked. 
In an October 4, 2013 letter, the District notified Toney she was being placed on 
administrative leave with pay while the District investigated an incident in which 
she "violated district policy by creating a disruption to [her] assigned school by 
sharing personal information on another staff member to other staff and students at 
[the School]."  The letter instructed Toney not to "visit any Lee County facility, 
utilize any school equipment to communicate (including access to computers or e-
mail), [or] . . . contact fellow employees of the [District]." 
During her investigation, the Superintendent reviewed Toney's personnel file and 
discussed Toney's employment record with Webb.  The Superintendent's 
investigation revealed other instances of misconduct including challenging 
administrators, becoming irate with a parent, failing to follow School protocol, 
insubordination, and other unprofessional conduct.  The Superintendent also 
learned that while on leave, Toney contacted a Board member to discuss her 
concerns regarding the substitute teacher assigned to teach her classes.  
On December 18, 2013, the Superintendent notified Toney of her intent to 
recommend the termination of Toney's 2013-14 employment contract to the Board.  
The recommendation was based on Toney's conduct with regard to discussing 
another faculty member's personal information with other employees and her 
failure to adhere to the directives of an administrator.  The Superintendent's
recommendation was further based upon a review of Toney's personnel file, which 
revealed she had engaged in other incidents of unprofessional conduct.  The notice 
stated Toney displayed "unacceptable behavior" and "lack of candor" during the 
investigation into her conduct.  
The Board held hearings on April 28, June 7, and July 1, 8, and 29, 2014.  In her 
testimony, Toney denied the allegation she caused a disruption by sharing personal 
information about Teacher B.  According to Toney, she only repeated information 
she learned from another School employee that Teacher B had lost his spouse.  
Toney testified she was not aware Teacher B's spouse was a man. On July 29, 
2014, the Board voted to accept the Superintendent's recommendation to terminate 
Toney's employment.  Thereafter, on August 8, 2014, the Board issued its written 
decision. The Board found Toney had engaged in a pattern of unprofessional 
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conduct evidenced by repeated resistance to following the directives of supervisors 
and administrators.  Toney subsequently appealed the Board's decision to the 
circuit court.3 
Following a hearing, the circuit court reversed the Board's decision and ordered the 
reinstatement of Toney's employment contract with back pay and benefits.  The
court held (1) delivering the packet of Facebook posts to the Superintendent, even 
if inconsistent with the principal's directive, did not reflect upon Toney's fitness to 
teach; (2) Toney's communication with a Board member did not support 
termination; and (3) the record did not support the Board's finding that Toney had a 
pattern of unprofessional conduct amounting to evident unfitness to teach.  The 
circuit court subsequently denied the Board's motion to reconsider.  This appeal 
followed. 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Standard of Review 
The Board argues the circuit court erred in failing to apply the proper standard of 
review. 
Citing Kizer v. Dorchester County Vocational Education Board of Trustees, 287 
S.C. 545, 550, 340 S.E.2d 144, 147 (1986), the circuit court held "[w]here, as here, 
the challenged action arises from immediate termination, the record must contain 
evidence of unfitness to teach that is 'undeniably and abundantly present.'"  The 
circuit court also cited this court's holding in Barr v. Board of Trustees of 
Clarendon County School District Number 2, 319 S.C. 522, 526, 462 S.E.2d 316, 
318 (Ct. App. 1995), that the authority of the courts to review school board 
decisions is limited to determining whether the decision to terminate employment 
is supported by substantial evidence.
Although the circuit court quoted the "undeniably and abundantly present" 
language in its order, it appears the court made its decision using the substantial 
evidence standard of review. The court found the "record [did] not establish 
substantial evidence of Ms. Toney's unfitness to teach or failure to improve 
3 The Board's decision to terminate Toney's employment was not based on the 
comments Toney made to Teacher B at the September 2013 departmental meeting; 
rather, its decision was based, in part, on Toney's response to the directives she was
given by School administrators following the grievance filed by Teacher B.   
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performance to a satisfactory level following written notice, assistance and 
reasonable opportunity."   
On appeal, the Board contends the proper standard of review regarding the 
propriety of a teacher's termination is the substantial evidence test.  We agree.  See 
Kizer, 287 S.C. at 550, 340 S.E.2d at 147; Barr, 319 S.C. at 526, 462 S.E.2d at 
318; Felder v. Charleston Cty. Sch. Dist., 327 S.C. 21, 25, 489 S.E.2d 191, 193 
(1997); Hall v. Bd. of Trs. of Sumter Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 330 S.C. 402, 405, 499 
S.E.2d 216, 218 (Ct. App. 1998); Barrett v. Charleston Cty. Sch. Dist., 348 S.C. 
426, 431, 559 S.E.2d 365, 368 (Ct. App. 2001). 
In her brief, Toney cites Kizer and Hall to support her position that proof of 
conduct must be undeniably and abundantly present.  Toney misapprehends these 
cases. As explained by this court in Barrett, 
[i]n Kizer, the [s]upreme [c]ourt was merely typifying the 
evidence as undeniably and abundantly present, not 
articulating a new standard: "Therefore, the officially 
enunciated public policy of this State is to provide for 
immediate removal of those whose conduct manifests 
evident unfitness. Such conduct is undeniably and 
abundantly present in this case."  [287 S.C.] at 550, 340 
S.E.2d at 147. Earlier in the Kizer opinion, however, the 
[c]ourt stated that the substantial evidence test was the 
proper test.  Id. at 548, 340 S.E.2d at 146. Although the 
Hall case references the "undeniably and abundantly
present" language in Kizer, a reading of the entire Hall
opinion makes clear that the court is not declaring a new 
standard of review but is applying the substantial 
evidence test. 
348 S.C. at 432, 559 S.E.2d at 368.  Therefore, this court is limited to examining 
the record to determine whether substantial evidence supported the Board's 
decision to terminate Toney's employment.  "The court cannot substitute its 
judgment for that of the school board."  Felder, 327 S.C. at 25, 489 S.E.2d at 193. 
"'Substantial evidence' is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed 
blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as 
a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the 
administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action."  
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Laws v. Richland Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 270 S.C. 492, 495-96, 243 S.E.2d 192, 193 
(1978). 
II. Unprofessional Conduct Findings 
The Board argues the circuit court erred in holding the Board's findings of 
unprofessional conduct based upon (1) Toney's delivery of Facebook posts to a 
School administrator and the Superintendent; (2) her communication with a Board 
member; and (3) her pattern of conduct, did not support termination.   
Toney is a contract teacher.  As such, the rules regarding her termination fall under 
the South Carolina Teacher Employment and Dismissal Act, sections 59-25-410 to 
-530 of the South Carolina Code (2004 & Supp. 2016) (the Act). The Act provides 
for certain situations in which a school board can immediately terminate a teacher: 
Any teacher may be dismissed at any time who . . .  
manifest[s] an evident unfitness for teaching . . . . 
Evident unfitness for teaching is manifested by conduct 
such as, but not limited to, the following: persistent 
neglect of duty, willful violation of rules and regulations 
of district board of trustees, drunkenness, conviction of a 
violation of the law of this State or the United States, 
gross immorality, dishonesty, illegal use, sale or 
possession of drugs or narcotics. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 59-25-430 (2004).
A. Failure to Follow Directives 
Citing Hall, the circuit court found Toney's delivery of the packet of Facebook 
posts to McDaniel and the Superintendent, even if inconsistent with Webb's 
directive to "leave the matter alone" until his return to the School, did not reflect on 
Toney's fitness to teach.   
In Hall, the school board terminated Hall's employment as a media specialist due 
to her failure to supervise a class trip and her insubordination stemming from her
discussion of the matter with coworkers.  330 S.C. at 405, 499 S.E.2d at 217-18.  
Hall had agreed with another teacher, unbeknownst to the principal, that she would 
chaperone a trip to Florida only while traveling to and from Florida and during a 
shopping mall visit.  Id. at 404, 499 S.E.2d at 217. She would be "off duty" at all 
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other times.  Id. When the administration learned of the arrangement, the 
superintendent placed Hall on administrative leave and told her not to discuss the 
matter with any other employees.  Id. at 405, 499 S.E. 2d at 217.  Hall 
subsequently discussed the matter with three employees.  Id. The board terminated 
Hall's employment, and the circuit court reversed the board's decision.  Id. at 405, 
499 S.E.2d at 218. In affirming the circuit court, this court held "the [b]oard 
produced insufficient evidence to show that Hall's alleged insubordination 
demonstrated evident unfitness for teaching."  Id. at 409, 499 S.E.2d at 220.  The 
court found the record did not contain any evidence that Hall's insubordination in 
not following the superintendent's directive affected her primary duties as a media 
specialist. Id. at 410, 499 S.E.2d at 220. The court also held the record did not 
contain any evidence showing Hall attempted to undermine the investigation.  Id. 
One of the three conversations used to justify her termination occurred when a 
fellow teacher unassociated with the trip heard Hall was upset and called to check 
on her. Id. In addition, the superintendent did not know whether Hall initiated 
these conversations or their substance. Id. The court noted that "[w]hile we 
recognize that a single act of disobedience could, under some circumstances, be 
sufficient to justify a teacher's termination even though it was unrelated to that 
teacher's classroom performance, the scant evidence introduced here is insufficient 
to show Hall's unfitness for teaching within the meaning [of section] 59-25-430."  
Id. 
In the present case, the Board contends its decision to terminate Toney's 
employment was supported by substantial evidence.  The Board asserts that by 
delivering the packet of Facebook posts to the Superintendent, Toney failed to 
follow Webb's directive to not discuss the matter.  The Board also argues this case 
is distinguishable from Hall because here, unlike in Hall, the Superintendent, 
Webb, and McDaniel all testified Toney did not follow orders and initiated 
conversations in direct violation of Webb's directive.  In addition, the Board notes 
the record includes other examples of Toney's history of unprofessional conduct.   
"At common law, insubordination was defined as a wilful or intentional disregard 
of the lawful and reasonable instructions of an employer."  Id. at 409, 499 S.E.2d at 
220. "Notwithstanding this broad definition, our supreme court has limited its 
application in the context of teacher employment to cases where insubordination 
evidences 'unfitness to teach, substantially interfere[s] with the performance of [a 
teacher's] duty, and constitute[s] unprofessional conduct.'" Id. (alterations by 
court) (quoting Felder, 327 S.C. at 25, 489 S.E.2d at 193).   
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Although Toney disobeyed Webb's directive by discussing her situation with 
others, we find the Board failed to produce sufficient evidence showing Toney's 
alleged insubordination demonstrated evident unfitness to teach.  Section 59-25-
430 defines "unfitness for teaching" in a nonexclusive manner.  Nevertheless, the 
types of conduct referred to in the statute—persistent neglect of duty, wilful 
violation of rules and regulations, drunkenness, conviction of a crime, gross 
immorality, dishonesty, and illegal use, sale, or possession of drugs—exceed 
Toney's failure to comply with Webb's directive to not discuss the matter until his 
return to the School. The record does not contain substantial evidence Toney's 
insubordination affected her primary duties as a teacher.  Accordingly, we affirm
the circuit court as to this issue. 
B. Communication with a Board Member 
The circuit court found Toney did not violate any of the directives in the District's 
letter regarding Toney's contact with other District employees when she contacted 
a Board member about the qualifications of her substitute teacher.  The circuit 
court further held "any directive prohibiting Ms. Toney from communicating with 
a Board member on a matter of public concern unrelated to her personal 
circumstances would violate freedoms protected by the state and federal 
constitutions." 
On appeal, the Board argues the District's letter to Toney was not the only evidence 
of the directives given to her regarding contact with other employees.  The Board 
asserts the Superintendent advised Toney during a meeting that "[Toney] did not 
need to talk with anyone" and if "she had any questions, she could call [her]."  
According to the Superintendent, Toney "left [the meeting] with a good 
understanding that she was not going to have this communication with anyone."   
Toney testified she contacted a Board member after receiving a complaint from
one of her students regarding the substitute.  Toney admitted she did not follow the 
Superintendent's directive to contact her with any questions because she "didn't 
feel comfortable" taking her concerns to the Superintendent because their initial 
conference was "not a pleasant one."  Toney further testified she would not have 
contacted a Board member if the letter had stated she was not permitted to speak 
with any member of the Board. 
We find the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the Board's 
decision to terminate Toney's employment based upon her communication with a 
Board member. Notably, the District's letter did not prohibit Toney from 
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contacting a Board member.  Furthermore, her contact with the Board was not 
related to the reasons for her administrative leave.4  Substantial evidence does not 
indicate Toney willfully disregarded a directive in contacting a Board member.  
See Hall, 330 S.C. at 409, 499 S.E.2d at 220 ("At common law, insubordination 
was defined as a wilful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable 
instructions of an employer.").  Moreover, we find Toney's contact with the Board 
member did not amount to insubordination evidencing an unfitness to teach.  See 
id. ("Notwithstanding this broad definition, our supreme court has limited its 
application in the context of teacher employment to cases where insubordination 
evidences 'unfitness to teach, substantially interfere[s] with the performance of [a 
teacher's] duty, and constitute[s] unprofessional conduct.'"). Accordingly, we 
affirm the circuit court as to this issue.  
C. Pattern of Conduct 
The circuit court determined the record did not support the Board's finding that 
Toney engaged in a pattern of unprofessional conduct that demonstrated her 
unfitness to teach. The court found Toney had never been reprimanded by Webb 
for unprofessional conduct and Webb testified he had no reason to recommend 
Toney's termination prior to her removal from the School.  The court further noted 
Toney's teaching contract was renewed every year without any conditions.   
The Board asserts the following incidents demonstrated Toney's pattern of 
unprofessional conduct and failure to follow directives:  
(1) In a January 2006 letter, Toney's former principal, Lenora Scott, advised 
Toney that her inappropriate behavior could lead to termination.  The letter 
described an incident in which Toney questioned an assistant principal, 
became angry, and was not receptive to her requests.  Scott noted she found 
evidence of Toney's poor classroom management, inappropriate use of 
instructional time, and inappropriate questioning of students. Scott also 
stated Toney's behavior and attitude during a conference with Scott was 
argumentative, unprofessional, and unacceptable. 
4 The Board contends the circuit court erred in holding Toney's communication 
with a Board member was a matter of public concern.  The Board maintains 
Toney's communication was directly related to her personal circumstances.  We 
disagree. The record contains no indication Toney discussed her administrative 
leave with any member of the Board.   
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(2) In a March 2012 email, a former assistant principal reminded Toney that 
instructional materials were to be picked up during Toney's planning period.  
Webb testified Toney had previously sent students during class time to pick 
up materials and he addressed the matter with Toney.   
 
(3) In a February 2013 letter, Webb wrote to Toney, "[y]ou are receiving this 
letter as a reminder to make sure you always conduct yourself in a 
professional manner."  Webb testified the letter was sent because Toney 
became irate with a parent during a parent teacher conference and was acting 
unprofessionally.  
 
(4) On May 7, 2013, Webb wrote to Toney regarding her failure to enter fourth 
quarter grades. 
 
(5) In September 2013, Toney was again advised not to send students to collect 
supplies during class time.   
 
(6) In a September 2013 email, Kara Fowler, a member of the School's 
administrative team, provided feedback to Toney regarding Fowler's 
classroom observation of Toney's teaching.  Toney responded via email the 
next day. Webb testified Toney's reaction to the observation was negative, 
defensive, and not supportive of the instructional process.   
 
(7) Toney was cited in September 2013 for failing to attend a mandatory faculty 
meeting. 
 
We find the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the Board's 
decision to terminate Toney's employment based upon a pattern of unprofessional 
conduct. As noted by Toney, Webb testified that prior to Toney's placement on 
administrative leave in October 2013, he had no reason to recommended Toney's 
employment be terminated.  In addition, we note that while the record contains 
some evidence of unprofessional conduct, Toney was continually offered a 
contract to teach through the 2013-14 school year.  Furthermore, Toney's personnel 
file only included the 2006 incident described above and none of the other 
documents listed above were placed in her file or considered as grounds for 
disciplinary action. We find the incidents cited above by the Board do not reveal a 
pattern of conduct demonstrating Toney's unfitness for teaching within the 
meaning of section 59-25-430. 
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the circuit court's reversal of the Board's decision because the record 
does not contain substantial evidence to support the Board's decision to terminate 
Toney's employment contract for the 2013-14 school year under section 59-25-430.  
AFFIRMED. 

KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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